Alexander I of Russia
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Portrait of Emperor Alexander I
|Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias|
|Reign||23 March 1801 – 1 December 1825|
|Coronation||15 September 1801|
23 December 1777|
|Died||1 December 1825
|Burial||Peter and Paul Cathedral|
|Consort||Princess Louise of Baden|
|Issue||Grand Duchess Maria Alexandrovna
Grand Duchess Elizabeth Alexandrovna
|Mother||Sophie Dorothea of Württemberg|
Alexander I (Russian: Александр Павлович, Aleksandr Pavlovich; 23 December [O.S. 12 December] 1777 – 1 December [O.S. 19 November] 1825[a]) reigned as Emperor of Russia from 23 March 1801 to 1 December 1825. He was the son of Paul I and Sophie Dorothea of Württemberg. Alexander was the first Russian King of Poland, reigning from 1815 to 1825, as well as the first Russian Grand Duke of Finland. He was sometimes called Alexander the Blessed.
He was born in Saint Petersburg to Grand Duke Paul Petrovich, later Emperor Paul I, and succeeded to the throne after his father was murdered. He ruled Russia during the chaotic period of the Napoleonic Wars. As prince and emperor, Alexander often used liberal rhetoric, but continued Russia's absolutist policies in practice. In the first years of his reign, he initiated some minor social reforms and (in 1803–04) major, liberal educational reforms, such as building more universities. He promised constitutional reforms and a desperately needed reform of serfdom in Russia but made no concrete proposals. Alexander appointed Mikhail Speransky, the son of a village priest, as one of his closest advisors. The Collegia was abolished and replaced by the The State Council, which was created to improve legislation. Plans were also made to set up a parliament and sign a constitution.
In foreign policy, he changed Russia's position relative to France four times between 1804 and 1812 among neutrality, opposition, and alliance. In 1805 he joined Britain in the War of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, but after the massive defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz he switched and formed an alliance with Napoleon by the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) and joined Napoleon's Continental System. He fought a small-scale naval war against Britain between 1807 and 1812. He and Napoleon could never agree, especially about Poland, and the alliance collapsed by 1810. The tsar's greatest triumph came in 1812 as Napoleon's invasion of Russia proved a total disaster for the French. As part of the winning coalition against Napoleon he gained some spoils in Finland and Poland. He formed the Holy Alliance to suppress revolutionary movements in Europe that he saw as immoral threats to legitimate Christian monarchs. He helped Austria's Klemens von Metternich in suppressing all national and liberal movements.
In the second half of his reign he was increasingly arbitrary, reactionary and fearful of plots against him; he ended many earlier reforms. He purged schools of foreign teachers, as education became more religiously oriented as well as politically conservative. Speransky was replaced as advisor with the strict artillery inspector Aleksey Arakcheyev, who oversaw the creation of military settlements. Alexander died of typhus in December 1825 while on a trip to southern Russia. He left no children as heirs and both of his brothers wanted the other to become emperor. After a period of great confusion that included the failed Decembrist revolt of liberal army officers, he was succeeded by his younger brother, Nicholas I.
- 1 Early life
- 2 Succession to the throne
- 3 Domestic policy
- 4 Napoleonic wars
- 5 Postbellum
- 6 Private life
- 7 Death
- 8 Children
- 9 Other
- 10 Ancestry
- 11 Notes
- 12 References
- 13 Further reading
- 14 External links
Alexander and his younger brother Constantine were raised by their grandmother, Catherine the Great. Some sources allege that she planned to remove her son (Alexander's father) Paul I from the succession altogether. From the free-thinking atmosphere of the court of Catherine and his Swiss tutor, Frédéric-César de La Harpe, he imbibed the principles of Rousseau's gospel of humanity. But from his military governor, Nikolay Saltykov, he imbibed the traditions of Russian autocracy. Andrey Afanasyevich Samborsky, whom his grandmother chose for his religious instruction, was an atypical, unbearded Orthodox priest. Samborsky had long lived in England and taught Alexander (and Constantine) excellent English, very uncommon for potential Russian autocrats at the time.
Succession to the throne
The death of Catherine in November 1796, before she could appoint Alexander as her successor, brought his father, Paul I, to the throne. Paul's unpopular policies led to a successful conspiracy to assassinate him. His son, then 23-year-old Alexander, was actually in the palace at the moment of the assassination, to whom General Nicholas Zubov, one of the assassins, announced his accession. Historians still debate Alexander's role in his father's murder. The most common opinion is that he was let into the conspirators' secret and was willing to take the throne but insisted that his father should not be killed. Alexander's having become Tsar through a crime that cost his father's life would give him a strong sense of remorse and shame.
Alexander I succeeded to the throne on 24 March 1801, and was crowned in the Kremlin on 15 September of that year.
At first, the Orthodox Church exercised little influence on Alexander's life. The young tsar was determined to reform the inefficient highly centralised systems of government that Russia relied upon. While retaining for a time the old ministers, one of the first acts of his reign was to appoint the Private Committee, comprising young and enthusiastic friends of his own—Victor Kochubey, Nikolay Novosiltsev, Pavel Stroganov and Adam Jerzy Czartoryski—to draw up a plan of domestic reform, which was supposed to result in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in accordance with the teachings of the Age of Enlightenment.
In a few years the liberal Mikhail Speransky became one of the Tsar's closest advisors, and drew up many plans for elaborate reforms. By the Government reform of Alexander I the old Collegia were abolished and new Ministries created in their place, having at their head ministers responsible to the Crown. A Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of the Sovereign dealt with all interdepartmental matters. The State Council was created in order to improve technique of legislation. It was intended to become the Second Chamber of representative legislature. The Governing Senate was reorganized as the Supreme Court of the Empire. The codification of the laws initiated in 1801 was never carried out during his reign.
Alexander wanted to resolve another crucial issue in Russia—the status of the serfs, although this was not achieved until 1861 (during the reign of his nephew Alexander II). His advisors quietly discussed the options at length. Cautiously, he extended the right to own land to most classes of subjects, including state-owned peasants, in 1801 and created a new social category of "free agriculturalist," for peasants voluntarily emancipated by their masters, in 1803. The great majority of serfs were not affected.
When Alexander's reign began, there were three universities in Russia, at Moscow, Vilna (Vilnius), and Dorpat (Tartu). These were strengthened, and three others were founded at St. Petersburg, Kharkov, and Kazan. Literary and scientific bodies were established or encouraged, and the reign became noted for the aid lent to the sciences and arts by the Emperor and the wealthy nobility. Alexander later expelled foreign scholars.
After 1815 the military settlements (farms worked by soldiers and their families under military control) were introduced, with the idea of making the army, or part of it, self-supporting economically and for providing it with recruits.
Views held by his contemporaries
Autocrat and "Jacobin", man of the world and mystic, Alexander appeared to his contemporaries as a riddle which each read according to his own temperament. Napoleon Bonaparte thought him a "shifty Byzantine", and called him the Talma of the North, as ready to play any conspicuous part. To Metternich he was a madman to be humoured. Castlereagh, writing of him to Lord Liverpool, gives him credit for "grand qualities", but adds that he is "suspicious and undecided"; and to Jefferson he was a man of estimable character, disposed to do good, and expected to diffuse through the mass of the Russian people "a sense of their natural rights".
Alliances with other powers
Upon his accession, Alexander reversed the policy of his father, Paul, denounced the League of Armed Neutrality, and made peace with Britain (April 1801). At the same time he opened negotiations with Francis II of the Holy Roman Empire. Soon afterwards at Memel he entered into a close alliance with Prussia, not as he boasted from motives of policy, but in the spirit of true chivalry, out of friendship for the young King Frederick William III and his beautiful wife Louise of Mecklenburg-Strelitz.
The development of this alliance was interrupted by the short-lived peace of October 1801; and for a while it seemed as though France and Russia might come to an understanding. Carried away by the enthusiasm of La Harpe, who had returned to Russia from Paris, Alexander began openly to proclaim his admiration for French institutions and for the person of Napoleon Bonaparte. Soon, however, came a change. La Harpe, after a new visit to Paris, presented to the Tsar his Reflections on the True Nature of the Consul for Life, which, as Alexander said, tore the veil from his eyes, and revealed Bonaparte "as not a true patriot", but only as "the most famous tyrant the world has produced". Later on, La Harpe and his friend Henri Monod lobbied Emperor Alexander, who persuaded the other Allied powers opposing Napoleon to recognise Vaudois and Argovian independence, in spite of Bern's attempts to reclaim them as subject lands. Alexander's disillusionment was completed by the execution of the duc d'Enghien on trumped up charges. The Russian court went into mourning for the last member of the House of Condé, and diplomatic relations with France were broken off. The Tsar was especially alarmed, and decided he had to somehow curb Napoleon's power.
Opposition to Napoleon
In opposing Napoleon I, "the oppressor of Europe and the disturber of the world's peace," Alexander in fact already believed himself to be fulfilling a divine mission. In his instructions to Novosiltsov, his special envoy in London, the Tsar elaborated the motives of his policy in language which appealed as little to the common sense of the prime minister, William Pitt the Younger, as did later the treaty of the Holy Alliance to that of the foreign minister, Castlereagh. Yet the document is of great interest, as in it we find formulated for the first time in an official dispatch the ideals of international policy which were to play so conspicuous a part in the affairs of the world at the close of the revolutionary epoch, and issued at the end of the 19th century in the Rescript of Nicholas II and the conference of the Hague. Alexander argued that the outcome of the war was not to be only the liberation of France, but the universal triumph of "the sacred rights of humanity". To attain this it would be necessary "after having attached the nations to their government by making these incapable of acting save in the greatest interests of their subjects, to fix the relations of the states amongst each other on more precise rules, and such as it is to their interest to respect".
A general treaty was to become the basis of the relations of the states forming "the European Confederation"; and this, though "it was no question of realising the dream of universal peace, would attain some of its results if, at the conclusion of the general war, it were possible to establish on clear principles the prescriptions of the rights of nations". "Why could not one submit to it", the Tsar continued, "the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been exhausted, having by this means brought to light the respective grievances, and tried to remove them? It is on such principles as these that one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, which, sanctioned by the greater part of the nations of Europe, would without difficulty become the immutable rule of the cabinets, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union".
1807 loss to French forces
Meanwhile, Napoleon, a little deterred by the Russian autocrat's youthful ideology, never gave up hope of detaching him from the coalition. He had no sooner entered Vienna in triumph than he opened negotiations with Alexander; he resumed them after the Battle of Austerlitz (2 December). Russia and France, he urged, were "geographical allies"; there was, and could be, between them no true conflict of interests; together they might rule the world. But Alexander was still determined "to persist in the system of disinterestedness in respect of all the states of Europe which he had thus far followed", and he again allied himself with the Kingdom of Prussia. The campaign of Jena and the battle of Eylau followed; and Napoleon, though still intent on the Russian alliance, stirred up Poles, Turks and Persians to break the obstinacy of the Tsar. A party too in Russia itself, headed by the Tsar's brother Constantine Pavlovich, was clamorous for peace; but Alexander, after a vain attempt to form a new coalition, summoned the Russian nation to a holy war against Napoleon as the enemy of the Orthodox faith. The outcome was the rout of Friedland (13/14 June 1807). Napoleon saw his chance and seized it. Instead of making heavy terms, he offered to the chastened autocrat his alliance, and a partnership in his glory.
The two Emperors met at Tilsit on 25 June 1807. Napoleon knew well how to appeal to the exuberant imagination of his new-found friend. He would divide with Alexander the Empire of the world; as a first step he would leave him in possession of the Danubian principalities and give him a free hand to deal with Finland; and, afterwards, the Emperors of the East and West, when the time should be ripe, would drive the Turks from Europe and march across Asia to the conquest of India, a realization of which was finally achieved by the British a few years later, and would change the course of modern history. Nevertheless, a thought awoke in Alexander's impressionable mind an ambition to which he had hitherto been a stranger. The interests of Europe as a whole were utterly forgotten.
The brilliance of these new visions did not, however, blind Alexander to the obligations of friendship; and he refused to retain the Danubian principalities as the price for suffering a further dismemberment of Prussia. "We have made loyal war", he said, "we must make a loyal peace". It was not long before the first enthusiasm of Tilsit began to wane. The French remained in Prussia, the Russians on the Danube; and each accused the other of breach of faith. Meanwhile, however, the personal relations of Alexander and Napoleon were of the most cordial character; and it was hoped that a fresh meeting might adjust all differences between them. The meeting took place at Erfurt in October 1808 and resulted in a treaty which defined the common policy of the two Emperors. But Alexander's relations with Napoleon nonetheless suffered a change. He realised that in Napoleon sentiment never got the better of reason, that as a matter of fact he had never intended his proposed "grand enterprise" seriously, and had only used it to preoccupy the mind of the Tsar while he consolidated his own power in Central Europe. From this moment the French alliance was for Alexander also not a fraternal agreement to rule the world, but an affair of pure policy. He used it, in the first instance, to remove "the geographical enemy" from the gates of Saint Petersburg by wresting Finland from Sweden (1809); and he hoped by means of it to make the Danube the southern frontier of Russia.
Events were in fact rapidly heading towards the rupture of the Franco-Russian alliance. While Alexander did indeed assist Napoleon in the war of 1809, he declared plainly that he would not allow the Austrian Empire to be crushed out of existence. Napoleon subsequently complained bitterly of the inactivity of the Russian troops during the campaign. The Tsar in his turn protested against Napoleon's encouragement of the Poles. In the matter of the French alliance he knew himself to be practically isolated in Russia, and he declared that he could not sacrifice the interest of his people and empire to his affection for Napoleon. "I don't want anything for myself", he said to the French ambassador, "therefore the world is not large enough to come to an understanding on the affairs of Poland, if it is a question of its restoration".
Alexander complained that the Treaty of Vienna, which added largely to the Duchy of Warsaw, had "ill requited him for his loyalty", and he was only mollified for the time being by Napoleon's public declaration that he had no intention of restoring Poland, and by a convention, signed on 4 January 1810, but not ratified, abolishing the Polish name and orders of chivalry.
But if Alexander suspected Napoleon's intentions, Napoleon was no less suspicious of Alexander. Partly to test his sincerity, Napoleon sent an almost peremptory request for the hand of the grand-duchess Anna Pavlovna, the tsar's youngest sister. After some little delay Alexander returned a polite refusal, pleading the princess's tender age and the objection of the dowager empress to the marriage. Napoleon's answer was to refuse to ratify the 4 January convention, and to announce his engagement to the archduchess Marie Louise in such a way as to lead Alexander to suppose that the two marriage treaties had been negotiated simultaneously. From this time on, the relationship between the two emperors gradually became more and more strained.
The annexation of Oldenburg, of which The Duke of Oldenburg (3 January 1754 – 2 July 1823) was the Tsar's uncle, by France in December 1810, added to the personal grievances of Alexander against Napoleon, while the ruinous impact of "the continental system" on Russian trade made it impossible for the Tsar to maintain a policy which was Napoleon's chief motive for the alliance.
Alexander kept Russia as neutral as possible in the ongoing French war with Britain. He allowed Russians to secretly continue to trade with Britain and did not enforce the blockade required by the Continental System. In 1810 he withdrew Russia from the Continental System and trade between Britain and Russia grew.
Franco-Russian relations became progressively worse after 1810. By 1811, it became clear that Napoleon was not keeping to his side of the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit. He had promised assistance to Russia in its war against Turkey, but as the campaign went on, France offered no support at all.
With war imminent between France and Russia, Alexander started to prepare the ground diplomatically. In April 1812 Russia and Sweden signed an agreement for mutual defence. A month later Alexander secured his southern flank through the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) which formally ended the war against Turkey. His diplomats managed to extract promises from Prussia and Austria that should Napoleon invade Russia, the former would help Napoleon as little as possible and that the latter would give no aid at all.
Militarily Mikhail Speransky had managed to improve the standard of the Russian land forces above that before the start of the 1807 campaign. Primarily on the advice of his sister and Count Aleksey Arakcheyev, Alexander did not take operational control as he had done during the 1807 campaign, but delegated control to his generals, Prince Michael Barclay de Tolly, Prince Pyotr Bagration and Mikhail Kutuzov.
War against Persia
Despite brief hostilities in the Persian Expedition of 1796, eight years passed before a new conflict erupted between the two empires. Following Georgia's annexation by Russia 1801, a subject of Persia for centuries, and the incorporation of the Derbent khanate as well quickly after, Alexander was determined to increase and maintain Russian influence in the notoriously strategically valuable Caucasus region. In 1801, Alexander appointed Pavel Tsitsianov, a die-hard Russian imperialist of Georgian origin, as Russian commander in chief of the Caucasus. Between 1802 and 1804 he proceeded to impose Russian rule on Western Georgia and some of the Persian controlled khanates around Georgia. Some of these khanates submitted without a fight but the Ganja Khanate resisted, prompting an attack. Ganja was ruthlessly sacked during the siege of Ganja, with some 3,000  – 7,000  inhabitants of Ganja executed, and thousands expelled to Iran. These attacks by Tsitsianov formed another casus belli.
On May 23, 1804, Iran demanded withdrawal from the regions Russia had occupied from Iran, comprising what is now Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Azerbaijan. Following Russia's refusal, and its subsequent storming of the Iranian town of Ganja in 1804 under Tsitsianov, the latter declared war. Following an almost 10 years stale war centred around what is now Dagestan, east Georgia, Azerbaijan, northern Armenia, with neither party being able to gain the clear upper hand, Russia eventually managed to turn the tide during a series of successful offensives, with the decisive victory being brought by Gen. Pyotr Kotlyarevsky following Persia's crushing defeat in the storming of Lankaran, making it sue for peace. On October 1813, negotiated with British mediation, and signed at Gulistan, the Treaty of Gulistan made the Persian Shah Fath Ali Shah, cede all Persian territories in the North Caucasus and most of its territories in the South Caucasus to Russia. This included what is now Dagestan, Georgia, and most of Azerbaijan. It also started a large demographic shift in the Caucasus, as many Muslim families emigrated to Iran.
In the summer of 1812 Napoleon invaded Russia. It was the occupation of Moscow and the desecration of the Kremlin, the sacred centre of Holy Russia, that changed his sentiment for Napoleon into passionate hatred.[b] The campaign of 1812 was the turning point of Alexander's life; after the burning of Moscow, he declared that his own soul had found illumination, and that he had realized once and for all the divine revelation to him of his mission as the peacemaker of Europe.
While the Russian army retreated into the depth of Russia for almost three months, the Russian nobility pressured Alexander I to relieve the commander of the Russian army, Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly. Alexander I complied and appointed Prince Mikhail Kutuzov to take over command of the army. On 7 September, the French faced the Russian army at a village Borodino, seventy miles west of Moscow. The battle that followed was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the Napoleonic Wars, involving more than 250,000 soldiers and resulting in 70,000 casualties. The outcome of the battle was inconclusive. The Russian army, undefeated in spite of the heavy losses, was able to withdraw the following day, leaving the French without the decisive victory Napoleon sought.
Napoleon entered Moscow a week later. There was no delegation to meet the Emperor. The Russians had evacuated the city, and the city's governor, Count Fyodor Rostopchin, ordered several strategic points in Moscow set ablaze. The loss of Moscow did not compel Alexander I to sue for peace. After staying a month Napoleon moved his army out southwest toward Kaluga, where Kutuzov was encamped with the Russian army. The French advance toward Kaluga was checked by the Russian army, and Napoleon was forced to retreat to the areas already devastated by the invasion. In the weeks that followed the Grande Armée starved and suffered from the onset of the Russian Winter. Lack of food and fodder for the horses and persistent attacks upon isolated troops from Russian peasants and Cossacks led to great losses in men. When the remnants of Napoleon's army crossed the Berezina River in November, only 27,000 effective soldiers remained; the Grand Armée had lost some 380,000 men dead and 100,000 captured. Following the crossing of the Berezina, Napoleon left the army and returned to Paris to protect his position as Emperor and to raise more forces to resist the advancing Russians. The campaign effectively ended on 14 December 1812, with the last French troops leaving Russian soil.
The campaign was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. The reputation of Napoleon was severely shaken, and French hegemony in Europe was dramatically weakened. The Grande Armée, made up of French and allied invasion forces, was reduced to a fraction of its initial strength. These events triggered a major shift in European politics. France's ally Prussia, soon followed by Austria, broke their imposed alliance with France and switched sides. This triggered the War of the Sixth Coalition.
War of the Sixth Coalition
With the Russian armies following up victory over Napoleon in the Russian Campaign of 1812, the Sixth Coalition was formed with Russia, Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain and some other nations. Even though the French were victorious in the initial battles during the campaign in Germany, the Coalition armies eventually defeated them at the decisive Battle of Leipzig in the autumn of 1813. After the battle, the Pro-French German Confederation of the Rhine collapsed, thereby losing Napoleon's hold on Germany east of the Rhine. The supreme commander of the Coalition forces in the theatre and the paramount monarch among the three main Coalition monarchs, the Russian Tsar Alexander I, then ordered all Coalition forces in Germany to cross the Rhine and invade France.
The Coalition forces, divided into three groups, entered northeastern France in January 1814. Facing them in the theatre were the French forces numbering only about 70,000 men. In spite of being heavily outnumbered, Napoleon defeated the divided Coalition forces in the battles at Brienne and La Rothière, but could not stop the Coalition's advance. The Austrian emperor Francis I and King Frederick William III of Prussia felt demoralized upon hearing about Napoleon's victories since the start of the campaign. They even considered ordering a general retreat. But the Tsar Alexander I was far more determined than ever to victoriously enter Paris whatever the cost, imposing his will upon Schwarzenberg and the wavering monarchs. On 12 March, the Coalition forces advanced towards Paris and the city surrendered on 18 March. Until this battle it had been nearly 400 years since a foreign army had entered Paris, during the Hundred Years' War.
Camping outside the city on March 29, the Coalition forces were to assault the city from its northern and eastern sides the next morning in March 30. The battle started that same morning with intense artillery bombardment from the Coalition army. Early in the morning the Coalition attack began when the Russians attacked and drove back the French skirmishers near Belleville before themselves driven back by French cavalry from the city's eastern suburbs. By 7:00 a.m. the Russians attacked the Young Guard near Romainville in the center of the French lines and after some time and hard fighting pushed them aback. A few hours later the Prussians, under Blücher, attacked north of the city and carried the French position around Aubervilliers, but did not press their attack. The Württemberg troops seized the positions at Saint-Maur to the southwest, with Austrian troops in support. The Russian forces then assailed the Montmartre Heights in the city's northeast. Control of the heights was severely contested, until the French forces surrendered.
Alexander I sent an envoy to meet with the French to hasten the surrender. He offered generous terms to the French and, although having intended to avenge Moscow, declared himself to be bringing peace to France rather than its destruction. On March 31 Talleyrand gave the key of the city to the Tsar. Later that day the Coalition armies triumphantly entered the city with the Tsar at the head of the army followed by the King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg. On April 2, the Senate passed the Acte de déchéance de l'Empereur, which declared Napoleon deposed. Napoleon was in Fontainebleau when he heard that Paris had surrendered. Outraged, he wanted to march on the capital, but his marshals refused to fight for him and repeatedly urged him to surrender. He abdicated in favour of his son on 4 April, but the Allies rejected this out of hand, forcing Napoleon to abdicate unconditionally on April 6. The terms of his abdication, which included his exile to the Isle of Elba, were settled in the Treaty of Fontainebleau on April 11. A reluctant Napoleon ratified it two days later. The War of the Sixth Coalition was over.
Peace of Paris and the Congress of Vienna
Alexander tried to calm the unrest of his conscience by correspondence with the leaders of the evangelical revival on the continent, and sought for omens and supernatural guidance in texts and passages of scripture. It was not, however, according to his own account, till he met the Baroness de Krüdener—a religious adventuress who made the conversion of princes her special mission—at Basel, in the autumn of 1813, that his soul found peace. From this time a mystic pietism became the avowed force of his political, as of his private actions. Madame de Krüdener, and her colleague, the evangelist Henri-Louis Empaytaz, became the confidants of the emperor's most secret thoughts; and during the campaign that ended in the occupation of Paris the imperial prayer-meetings were the oracle on whose revelations hung the fate of the world.
Such was Alexander's mood when the downfall of Napoleon left him one of the most powerful sovereigns in Europe. With the memory of the treaty of Tilsit still fresh in men's minds, it was not unnatural that to cynical men of the world like Klemens Wenzel von Metternich he merely seemed to be disguising "under the language of evangelical abnegation" vast and perilous schemes of ambition. The puzzled powers were, in fact, the more inclined to be suspicious in view of other, and seemingly inconsistent, tendencies of the emperor, which yet seemed all to point to a like disquieting conclusion. For Madame de Krüdener was not the only influence behind the throne; and, though Alexander had declared war against the Revolution, La Harpe (his erstwhile tutor) was once more at his elbow, and the catchwords of the gospel of humanity were still on his lips. The very proclamations which denounced Napoleon as "the genius of evil", denounced him in the name of "liberty," and of "enlightenment". A monstrous intrigue was suspected for the alliance of the eastern autocrat with the Jacobinism of all Europe, which would have issued in the submission of an all-powerful Russia for an all-powerful France. At the Congress of Vienna Alexander's attitude accentuated this distrust. Castlereagh, whose single-minded aim was the restoration of "a just equilibrium" in Europe, reproached the Tsar to his face for a "conscience" which suffered him to imperil the concert of the powers by keeping his hold on Poland in violation of his treaty obligation.
Liberal political views
Once a supporter of limited liberalism, as seen in his approval of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland in 1815, from the end of the year 1818 Alexander's views began to change. A revolutionary conspiracy among the officers of the guard, and a foolish plot to kidnap him on his way to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, are said to have shaken the foundations of his Liberalism. At Aix he came for the first time into intimate contact with Metternich. From this time dates the ascendancy of Metternich over the mind of the Russian Emperor and in the councils of Europe. It was, however, no case of sudden conversion. Though alarmed by the revolutionary agitation in Germany, which culminated in the murder of his agent, the dramatist August von Kotzebue (23 March 1819), Alexander approved of Castlereagh's protest against Metternich's policy of "the governments contracting an alliance against the peoples", as formulated in the Carlsbad Decrees of July 1819, and deprecated any intervention of Europe to support "a league of which the sole object is the absurd pretensions of "absolute power".
He still declared his belief in "free institutions, though not in such as age forced from feebleness, nor contracts ordered by popular leaders from their sovereigns, nor constitutions granted in difficult circumstances to tide over a crisis." "Liberty", he maintained, "should be confined within just limits. And the limits of liberty are the principles of order".
It was the apparent triumph of the principles of disorder in the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont, combined with increasingly disquieting symptoms of discontent in France, Germany, and among his own people, that completed Alexander's conversion. In the seclusion of the little town of Troppau, where in October 1820 the powers met in conference, Metternich found an opportunity for cementing his influence over Alexander, which had been wanting amid the turmoil and feminine intrigues of Vienna and Aix. Here, in confidence begotten of friendly chats over afternoon tea, the disillusioned autocrat confessed his mistake. "You have nothing to regret," he said sadly to the exultant chancellor, "but I have!".
The issue was momentous. In January Alexander had still upheld the ideal of a free confederation of the European states, symbolised by the Holy Alliance, against the policy of a dictatorship of the great powers, symbolised by the Quadruple Treaty; he had still protested against the claims of collective Europe to interfere in the internal concerns of the sovereign states. On 19 November he signed the Troppau Protocol, which consecrated the principle of intervention and wrecked the harmony of the concert.
Revolt of the Greeks
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At the Congress of Laibach, to which the congress had been adjourned in the spring of 1821, Alexander first heard of the Revolt of the Greeks. From this time until his death, his mind was torn between his anxiety to realise his dream of a confederation of Europe and his traditional mission as leader of the Orthodox crusade against the Ottoman Empire. At first, under the careful nursing of Metternich, the former motive prevailed.
He struck the name of Alexander Ypsilanti (a colonel in the Imperial Cavalry and a leader of the Greek revolt) from the Russian army list, and directed his foreign minister, Ioannis Kapodistrias or Giovanni, Count Capo d'Istria, himself a Greek, to disavow all sympathy of Russia with his enterprise; and, in 1822, issued orders to turn back a deputation of the Morea to the Congress of Verona on the road.
He made some effort to reconcile the principles at conflict in his mind. He offered to surrender the claim, successfully asserted when the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II had been excluded from the Holy Alliance and the affairs of the Ottoman Empire from the deliberations of Vienna, that the affairs of the East were the "domestic concerns of Russia," and to march into the Ottoman Empire, as Austria had marched into Naples, "as the mandatory of Europe".
Metternich's opposition to this, illogical, but natural from the Austrian point of view, first opened Alexander's eyes to the true character of Austria's attitude towards his ideals. Once more in Russia, far from the fascination of Metternich's personality, the timeless spirit of his people drew him back into itself.
On 9 October 1793, Alexander married Louise of Baden, known as Elisabeth Alexeyevna after her conversion to the Orthodox Church. He later told his friend Frederick William III that the marriage, a political match devised by his grandmother, Catherine the Great, regrettably proved to be a misfortune for him and his spouse. Their two children died young. Their common sorrow drew the spouses closer together. Towards the close of his life their reconciliation was completed by the wise charity of the Empress in sympathising deeply with him over the death of his beloved daughter Sophia Naryshkina, the daughter of his mistress Maria Naryshkina, with whom he had a relationship from 1799 until 1818. In 1809, Alexander I was widely and famously rumored to have had an affair with the Finnish noble Ulla Möllersvärd and to have had a child by her, but this is not confirmed.
Tsar Alexander I became increasingly suspicious of those around him, especially after an attempt was made to kidnap him when he was on his way to the conference in Aachen, Germany. In the autumn of 1825 the Emperor undertook a voyage to the south of Russia due to the increasing illness of his wife. During his trip he himself caught a cold which developed into typhus from which he died in the southern city of Taganrog on 19 November (O.S.)/ 1 December 1825. His two brothers disputed who would become tsar—each wanted the other to become tsar. Rumours circulated for years that he had not died but had become the monk Feodor Kuzmich. His wife died a few months later as the emperor's body was transported to Saint Petersburg for the funeral. He was interred at the St. Peter and Paul Cathedral of the Peter and Paul Fortress in Saint Petersburg on 13 March 1826.
Alexander I Palace in Taganrog, where the Russian Emperor died in 1825.
- Alexander I was the godfather of future Queen Victoria who was christened Alexandrina Victoria in honour of the tsar.
- Alexander I was the namesake for the Alexanderplatz in Berlin, Germany.
- It was due to Alexander I that the first name "Alexander", hitherto virtually unknown in Russia, became one of the most common Russian names.
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- During Alexander's life time Russia used the Julian calendar (Old Style), but unless otherwise stated, any date in this article uses the Gregorian Calendar (New Style) — see the article "Old Style and New Style dates" for a more detailed explanation.
- On the historiography, see Lieven 2006, pp. 283–308.
- Maiorova 2010, p. 114.
- Troubetzkoy 2002, pp. 7, 205 and 258.
- Walker 1992, pp. 343–360.
- "Alexander I". Retrieved 2009-01-01.
- McGrew 1992, p. 184.
- Phillips 1911, p. 556.
- Phillips 1911, p. 559.
- Palmer 1974, ch 3.
- Palmer 1974, pp. 52–55.
- Palmer 1974, pp. 168–72.
- McCaffray 2005, pp. 1–21.
- Flynn 1988, p. [page needed].
- Lipscomb & Bergh; Jefferson to Priestley, Washington, 29 November 1802
- Phillips 1911, p. 557.
- Esdaile 2009, pp. 192–193.
- Phillips 1911, p. 557 cites: Circular of Count Muraviev, Aug. 24, 1898.
- Phillips 1911, p. 557 cites Instructions to M. Novosiltsov, Sept. 11, 1804. Tatischeff, p. 82
- Phillips 1911, p. 557 cites: Savary to Napoleon, Nov. 18, 1807. Tatischeff, p. 232.
- Phillips 1911, pp. 557,558 cites: Coulaincourt to Napoleon, 4th report, Aug. 3, 1809. Tatischeff, p. 496.
- Zawadzki 2009, pp. 110–124.
- Phillips 1911, p. 558.
- Nolan 2002, p. 1666.
- Chapman 2001, p. 29.
- "Annexation of Georgia in Russia Empire (1801–1878)". tedsnet.de.
- "Russia and Britain in Persia: Imperial Ambitions in Qajar Iran". Retrieved 16 December 2014.
- Avery et al. 1991, p. 332.
- Baddeley 1908, p. 67 cites "Tsitsianoff's report to the Emperor: Akti, ix (supplement), p. 920".
- Mansoori 2008, p. 245.
- "Islam, nationalism and state in the Muslim Caucasus1". Retrieved 22 December 2014.
- Phillips 1911, p. 558 cites: Alexander speaking to Colonel Michaud. Tatischeff, p. 612.
- Austrian K.u.K. interests were not identical with Russian imperialism. Austria not only could not afford to switch sides straight away, because she was since 1809 French ally in dynastical sense also - and this was one of the motives, why Austria joined coalition only after Napoleon refused solution by negotiation. Austria was generally not happy with Russian Tzar's line: e.g. in 1809, as French ally, Russia attempted to seize Austrian Krakow and was only thwarted by Poniatowski in the head of Polish hulans (who thus managed to seize the town for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw); and above all wished to avert Russian expansion to Balkan, which intention during time became to be understood as common interest of the power balance in Europe, and finally manifested itself as the Crimean War. In the same time Austria wished to avert supposed Russian enmity, which would result, when Austria could be seen as intending to block Russian imperial ambitions; an attitude justified by the mentioned war, when Austria took neutral stance. Only then begun Russia understand, Austria is not condescending to further Russian expansion, and further on took this neutrality as hostility, which became one of the causes of World War I. (Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1994)
- Sebag Montefiore, Simon (2016). The Romanovs 1613–1918. Orion Publishing Group Ltd. p. 313. ISBN 978 0 297 85266 7.
- Sebag Montefiore 2016, p. 314.
- Sebag Montefiore 2016, p. 313.
- Phillips 1911, p. 558 cites Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 2, 1814. F.O. Papers. Vienna VII.
- Phillips 1911, p. 558 cites: Despatch of Lieven, Nov. 30 (Dec. 12), 1819, and Russ. Circular of Jan. 27, 1820. Martens IV. part i. p. 270.
- Phillips 1911, pp. 558,559 cites: Aperçu des idées de l'Empereur, Martens IV. part i. p. 269.
- Phillips 1911, p. 559 cites: Metternich Mem.
- Palmer 1974, pp. 154–55.
- Möllersvärd (Möllerswärd), släkt, urn:sbl:8681, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (art av H G-m), hämtad 2016-11-05.
- Palmer 1974, ch 22.
- Palmer 1974, p. [page needed].
- McNaughton 1973, pp. 293–306.
- Palmer 1974, pp. 418–419.
- Avery, Peter; Fisher, William Bayne; Hambly, Gavin; Melville, Charles (1991). The Cambridge history of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press. p. 332. ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0.
- Baddeley, John F. (1908). The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus. London: Longmans, Green and Company. p. 67.
- Chapman, Tim (2001). Imperial Russia, 1801–1905 (illustrated, reprint ed.). Routledge. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-415-23110-7.
- Dowling, Timothy C. (2014). Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 728. ISBN 978-1-59884-948-6.
- Esdaile, Charles (2009). Napoleon's Wars: An International History. Penguin. pp. 192–193.
- Flynn, James T. (1988). University Reform of Tsar Alexander I, 1802–1835.
- "Jefferson to Priestley, Washington, 29 November 1802". The Thomas Jefferson Papers Series 1. General Correspondence. 1651-1827. Library of Congress.
- Lipscomb; Bergh (eds.). "Jefferson to Harris, Washington, 18 April 1806". The Writings of Thomas Jefferson.
- Lieven, Dominic (2006). "Review article: Russia and the defeat of Napoleon". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 7 (2): 283–308.
- McCaffray, Susan P. (2005). "Confronting Serfdom in the Age of Revolution: Projects for Serf Reform in the Time of Alexander I". Russian Review. 64 (1): 1–21. JSTOR 3664324.
- Maiorova, Olga (2010). From the Shadow of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855–1870. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 114.
- Mansoori, Firooz (2008). "17". Studies in History,Language and Culture of Azerbaijan (in Persian). Tehran: Hazar-e Kerman. p. 245. ISBN 978-600-90271-1-8.
- McNaughton, C. Arnold (1973). The Book of Kings: A Royal Genealogy, in 3 volumes. 1. London, U.K.: Garnstone Press. pp. 293–306.
- Nolan, Cathal J. (2002). The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: S-Z. The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Cathal. 4 (illustrated ed.). Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 1666. ISBN 978-0-313-32383-6.
- "Noxçiyçö". www.worldleadersindex.org. 15 September 2014. Retrieved 9 March 2015.
- Palmer, Alan (1974). Alexander I: Tsar of War and Peace. New York: Harper and Row.
- Troubetzkoy, Alexis S. (2002). Imperial Legend: The Mysterious Disappearance of Tsar Alexander I. Arcade Publishing. ISBN 1-55970-608-2.
- Walker, Franklin A (1992). "Enlightenment and Religion in Russian Education in the Reign of Tsar Alexander I". History of Education Quarterly. 32 (3): 343–360. JSTOR 368549.
- Zawadzki, Hubert (2009). "Between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander: The Polish Question at Tilsit, 1807". Central Europe. 7 (2): 110–124.
- This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Phillips, Walter Alison (1911). "Alexander I.". In Chisholm, Hugh. Encyclopædia Britannica. 1 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 556–559.
- Cate, Curtis. The War of the Two Emperors: The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander: Russia, 1812 (1985)
- Flynn, James T. The University Reform of Tsar Alexander I, 1802–1835 (Catholic University of America Press, 1988)
- Hartley, Janet M. Alexander I (1994) 256pp
- Lieven, Dominic. "Review article: Russia and the defeat of Napoleon." Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (2006)7#2 pp: 283–308.
- Lieven, Dominic (2009). Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814. Allen Lane/The Penguin Press. p. 617.
- McConnell, Allen. Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer (1970)
- Raeff, Marc. Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839 (The Hague: Mouton, 1968);
- Rey, Marie-Pierre. Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon (Northern Illinois University Press; 2012) 439 pages; translation of a 2009 French scholarly biography
- Schnitzler, Jean-Henri; Schnitzler, Johann Heinrich (1847). "Chapter I. Character of Alexander I". Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia Under the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas. R. Bentley. p. 37.
- Media related to Alexander I of Russia at Wikimedia Commons
- on YouTube – Historical reconstruction "The Romanovs". StarMedia. Babich-Design(Russia, 2013)
Alexander I of Russia
Cadet branch of the House of OldenburgBorn: 23 December 1777 Died: 1 December 1825
|Emperor of Russia
Gustav IV Adolf
|Grand Duke of Finland
|King of Poland
Grand Duke of Lithuania