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Wahhabism (Arabic: وهابية‎, Wahhābiyyah) is an ultra-conservative[1] branch of Sunni Islam.[2][3] It is a religious movement among fundamentalist Islamic believers, with an aspiration to return to the earliest fundamental Islamic sources of the Quran and Hadith, with inspiration from the teachings of Medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah and early jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal.[4] Wahhabism was a popular revivalist movement instigated by an eighteenth century theologian, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) from Najd, Saudi Arabia. He began his movement through peaceful discussions with attendees of various shrines[5] and eventually gained popular support by convincing the local Amir, Uthman ibn Mu'ammar, to help him in his struggle.[6] His has become the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.[7] The movement claims to adhere to the correct understanding of the general Islamic doctrine of Tawhid, on the "uniqueness" and "unity" of God, shared by the majority of Islamic sects, but with an emphasis on advocating following of the Athari school of thought only.[8] Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab was influenced by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and questioned the prevalent philosophical interpretations of Islam being the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools, claiming to rely on the Qur'an and the Hadith without speculative philosophy so as to not transgress beyond the limits of the early Muslims known as the Salaf.[8] He attacked a "perceived moral decline and political weakness" in the Arabian Peninsula and condemned what he perceived as idolatry, the popular cult of saints, and shrine and tomb visitation.[8]

The terms Wahhabi and Salafi and ahl al-hadith (people of hadith) are often used interchangeably, but Wahhabism has also been called "a particular orientation within Salafism",[3] and an orientation considered ultra-conservative and apolitical.[9][10] Salafism, on the other hand, has been termed as the hybridation between the teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and others which have taken place since the 1960s.[11]

The movement gained unchallenged precedence in the Arabian peninsula through an alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the House of Muhammad ibn Saud who provided political and financial power for the religious revival represented by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The writer El Khabar Ousbouî suggests the popularity of the Wahhabi movement is in part due to this alliance and the funding of several religious channels.[12]



Mohammad Hayya Al-Sindhi

Zain Imran's teacher Abdallah ibn Ibrahim ibn Sayf introduced the relatively young man to Mohammad Hayya Al-Sindhi in Medina and recommended him as a student. Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and al-Sindi became very close and Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab stayed with him for some time. Scholars have described Muhammad Hayya as having an important influence on Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, encouraging him to denounce rigid imitation of classical commentaries and to utilize informed individual analysis (ijtihad). Muhammad Hayya also taught Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab to reject popular religious practices associated with walis and their tombs that resembles later Wahhabi teachings. Muhammad Hayya and his milieu are important for understanding the origins of at least the Wahhabi revivalist impulse.[13]

Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab

Mohammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab studied in Basra (now in southern Iraq) and is reported to have developed his ideas there.[14][15] He is reported to have studied in Mecca and Medina while there to perform Hajj[16][17] before returning to his home town of 'Uyayna in 1740.

After his return to 'Uyayna, ibn Abd-al-Wahhab began to attract followers, including the ruler of the town, Uthman ibn Mu'ammar. With Ibn Mu'ammar's support, ibn Abd-al-Wahhab began to implement some of his ideas such as leveling the grave of Zayd ibn al-Khattab, one of the Sahaba (companions) of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad, and ordering that an adulteress be stoned to death. These actions were disapproved of by Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr of the tribe of Bani Khalid, the chief of Al-Hasa and Qatif, who held substantial influence in Nejd and ibn Abd-al-Wahhab was expelled from 'Uyayna.[18]

Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab was invited to settle in neighboring Diriyah by its ruler Muhammad ibn Saud in 1740 (1157 AH), two of whose brothers had been students of Ibn Abdal-Wahhab. Upon arriving in Diriyya, a pact was made between Ibn Saud and Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, by which Ibn Saud pledged to implement and enforce Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab's teachings, while Ibn Saud and his family would remain the temporal "leaders" of the movement.

Alliance with the House of Ibn Saud

Beginning in the last years of the 18th century Ibn Saud and his heirs would spend the next 140 years mounting various military campaigns to seize control of Arabia and its outlying regions,[19]

One of their most famous and controversial attacks was on Karbala in 1802 (1217 AH). There, according to a Wahhabi chronicler `Uthman b. `Abdullah b. Bishr:

"[Wahhabis] scaled the walls, entered the city ... and killed the majority of its people in the markets and in their homes. [They] destroyed the dome placed over the grave of al-Husayn [and took] whatever they found inside the dome and its surroundings. .... the grille surrounding the tomb which was encrusted with emeralds, rubies, and other jewels. .... different types of property, weapons, clothing, carpets, gold, silver, precious copies of the Qur'an."[20]

However, in 1818 they were defeated by Ottoman forces[19].

The Saudi government established the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a state religious police unit, to enforce religiously conservative rules of behaviour.[21]

Saudi Funding

The Saudis have spent at least $87 billion propagating Wahhabism abroad during the past two decades, and the scale of financing is believed to have increased in the past two years. The bulk of this funding goes towards the construction and operating expenses of mosques, madrasas, and other religious institutions that preach Wahhabism. It also supports imam training; mass media and publishing outlets; distribution of textbooks and other literature; and endowments to universities (in exchange for influence over the appointment of Islamic scholars). Some of the hundreds of thousands of non-Saudis who live in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf have been influenced by Wahhabism and preach Wahhabism in their home country upon their return. Agencies controlled by the Kingdom's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da'wah and Guidance are responsible for outreach to non-Muslim residents and are converting hundreds of non-Muslims into Islam every year.[22][23][24][25][26]


The Wahhabi subscribe to the primary doctrine of the uniqueness and unity of God (Tawhid).[8][27] The first aspect being belief in Allah and His Lordship that He alone is the believer's lord or Rabb. The second being that once one affirms the oneness of worship to Allah and Allah alone. The third is belief and affirmation of Allah's Names and Attributes.

Wahhabi theology is very precise in its creed or Aqeedah where the Quran and Hadith are the only fundamental and authoritative texts taken with the understanding of the Salaf. Commentaries and "the examples of the early Muslim community (Ummah) and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (AD 632–661)" known as Athar narrations are used to support these texts, hence the name of the school of theology given as Athari, but are not considered independently authoritative.[28]

However Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not totally condemn taqlid, or blind adherence, only at scholarly level in the face of a clear evidence or proof from a hadeeth or Qur'anic text.[29] Although Wahhabis are associated with the Hanbali school, early disputes did not center on fiqh and the belief that Wahhabism was borne of Hanbali thought has been called a "myth".[30]

Condemnation of "priests" and other religious leaders

His idea was that what he perceived to be blind deference to religious authority obstructs this direct connection with the Qur'an and Sunnah, leading him to deprecate the importance and full authority of leaders at the time, such as the scholars and mufti's of the age. When arguing for his positions, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would use translations and interpretation of the verses (known as ayat in Arabic) of the Qur'an that were contrary to the consensus amongst the scholars of the age, and positions against which there had been consensus for centuries. This methodology was considered extremely controversial at the time, in opposition to established clergy of the era, and was refuted as being erroneous by a number of scholars.[31][32][33]


This was seen as a revival of the tradition recorded whereby the early students of the scholars of the Madh'habs would leave their teacher's position in light of a newly found evidence once the hadeeth had been collected.[34]


Adherents to the Wahhabi movement take their theological viewpoint with an aspiration to assimilate with the beliefs of the early Muslims, being the first three generations otherwise known as the Salaf. This theology was taken from exegesis of the Quran and statements of the early Muslims and later codified by a number of scholars, the most well known being the 13th century Syrian scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, into what is now known as the Athari theological creed. This was upheld by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in his various works on theology.[35]

Some criticism accuses this school as being anthropomorphic however Ibn Taymiyyah in his monumental work Al-Aqidah Al-Waasitiyyah refutes the stance of the Mushabbihah (those who liken the creation with God: anthropomorphism) and those who deny, negate, and resort to allegorical/metaphorical interpretations of the Divine Names and Attributes. He contends that the methodology of the Salaf is to take the middle path between the extremes of anthropomorphism and negation/distortion. He further states that salaf affirmed all the Names and Attributes of God without tashbih (establishing likeness), takyeef (speculating as to "how" they are manifested in the divine), ta'teel (negating/denying their apparent meaning) and without ta'weel (giving it secondary/symbolic meaning which is different from the apparent meaning).[36][37]

Criticism and controversy

Naming controversy: Wahhabism and Salafism

Ibn Abd-Al-Wahab's aversion to the elevation of scholars and other individuals helps explain the preference of so-called "Wahhabis" for the term "Salafi". Among those who criticize the use of the term "Wahhabi" is social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz. In a footnote of his report, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,[38] he wrote:

Opponents of Salafism frequently affix the "Wahhabi" designator to denote foreign influence. It is intended to signify followers of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and is most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority of the Muslim community, but have made recent inroads in "converting" the local population to the movement ideology. … The Salafi movement itself, however, never uses this term. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use "Wahhabi" in their title or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as "Salafi/Wahhabi").

According to Riadh Sidaoui, habitual use of the term Wahhabism is wrong, and the concept of Saudi Wahhabism should be substituted[clarification needed][citation needed]

Other observers describe the term as "originally used derogatorily by opponents", but now commonplace and used even "by some Najdi scholars of the movement".[3]

Criticism by other Muslims

Initial opposition

Allegedly the first people to oppose Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were his father Abd al-Wahhab and his brother Salman Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was an Islamic scholar and qadi. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's brother wrote a book in refutation of his brothers' new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab"), also known as: "Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").

In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[39] Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communications between Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).

Shi'a criticism

In 1801 and 1802, the Saudi Wahhabis under Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud attacked and captured the holy Shia cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and destroyed the tombs of Husayn ibn Ali who is the grandson of Muhammad, and son of Ali (Ali bin Abu Talib), the son-in-law of Muhammad (see: Saudi sponsorship mentioned previously). In 1803 and 1804 the Saudis captured Makkah and Madinah and demolished various venerated shrines, monuments and removed a number of what was seen as sources or possible gateways to polytheism or Shirk - such as the shrine built over the tomb of Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad. In 1998 the Saudis bulldozed and allegedly poured gasoline over the grave of Aminah bint Wahb, the mother of Muhammad, causing resentment throughout the Muslim World.[40][41][42]

Sufi criticism

The Syrian professor and scholar Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti [43] criticises the Salafi movement in a few of his works.

The sufi Islamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani classify Wahhabbism as being extremist and heretical based on Wahhabbism's rejection of sufism and what they believe to be traditional sufi scholars.[44][45][46] However the ISCA is alleged to have links to the neoconservative lobby in the United States, hence explaining the groups hatred for the "wahhabi" movement. Kabbani allegedly thanked UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 2005 for the role the UK played in the Middle East, saying: “We are glad to see changes taking place in the political mechanisms in the Middle East. We hope to see an end to tyranny and we are happy to observe a strong upsurge in freedom of speech, freedom of belief and political openness in the region.” [47]

Wahabbism is intensely opposed by some Hui Muslims in China, primarily by the Sufi Khafiya, some Hanafi Sunni Gedimu and a number of Jahriyya. The Yihewani (Ikhwan) Chinese sect founded by Ma Wanfu in China was originally inspired by the Wahhabi movement however the group reacted with hostility to Ma Debao and Ma Zhengqing, who attempted to introduce Wahhabism as the Orthodox main form of Islam. They were branded as traitors of foreign influence, alien to the native popular cultural practices of Islam in China, and Wahhabi teachings were deemed as heresy by the Yihewani leaders. Ma Debao established a Salafi / Wahhabi order, called the Sailaifengye menhuan in Lanzhou and Linxia, separate from other Muslim sects in China.[48] Salafis have a reputation for radicalism among the Hanafi Sunni Gedimu and Yihewani. Sunni Muslim Hui avoid Salafis, including family members.[49] The number of Salafis in China is so insignificant that they are not included in classifications of Muslim sects in China.[50]

The Kuomintang Sufi Muslim general Ma Bufang, who backed the Yihewani (Ikhwan) Muslims, persecuted the Salafi / Wahhabi Muslims. The Yihewani forced the Salafis into hiding. They were not allowed to move or worship openly. The Yihewani had become secular and a Chinese nationalist organisation, and they considered the Salafis to be "Heterodox" (xie jiao), and "people who followed foreigner's teachings" (wai dao). After the Communist revolution the Salafis were allowed to worship openly until a 1958 crackdown on all religious practices.[51]

The Deobandi Alim Abd al-Hafiz al-Makki has argued that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab viewed authentic sufism in a positive light comparing it to the sciences of tafseer, hadith, and fiqh.[52]

As proof, the Shaykh also cites a letter in which Abd-al-Wahhab writes;

We do not negate the way of the Sufis and the purification of the inner self from the vices of those sins connected to the heart and the limbs as long as the individual firmly adheres to the rules of Shari‘ah and the correct and observed way. However, we will not take it on ourselves to allegorically interpret (ta’wil) his speech and his actions. We only place our reliance on, seek help from, beseech aid from and place our confidence in all our dealings in Allah Most High. He is enough for us, the best trustee, the best mawla and the best helper. May Allah send peace on our master Muhammad, his family and companions.

Wahhabism in the United States

A study conducted by the NGO Freedom House found Wahhabi publications in mosques in the United States. These publications included statements that Muslims should not only "always oppose" infidels "in every way", but "hate them for their religion … for Allah's sake", that democracy "is responsible for all the horrible wars of the 20th century", and that Shia and certain Sunni Muslims were infidels.[53][54]

The Saudi government issued a response to this report, stating: "[It has] worked diligently during the last five years to overhaul its education system [but] [o]verhauling an educational system is a massive undertaking".

A review of the study by Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) complained the study cited documents from only a few mosques, arguing most mosques in the U.S. are not under Wahhabi influence.[55] ISPU comments on the study were not entirely negative however, and concluded:

American-Muslim leaders must thoroughly scrutinize this study. Despite its limitations, the study highlights an ugly undercurrent in modern Islamic discourse that American-Muslims must openly confront. However, in the vigor to expose strains of extremism, we must not forget that open discussion is the best tool to debunk the extremist literature rather than a suppression of First Amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.[55]

Militant and political Islam

What connection, if any, there is between Wahhabism and Jihadi Salafis is disputed. Natana De Long-Bas, senior research assistant at the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, argues:

The militant Islam of Osama bin Laden did not have its origins in the teachings of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and was not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in contemporary Saudi Arabia, yet for the media it came to define Wahhabi Islam during the later years of bin Laden's lifetime. However "unrepresentative" bin Laden's global jihad was of Islam in general and Wahhabi Islam in particular, its prominence in headline news took Wahhabi Islam across the spectrum from revival and reform to global jihad.[56]

Noah Feldman distinguishes between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis and what he calls the "followers of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s," such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chapters and other hard-line Islamists" during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance to Muslim governments and assassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, not the individual believer".[57]

Karen Armstrong states that Osama bin Laden, like most extremists, followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, not "Wahhabism".[58]

Destruction of Islam's early historical sites

The Wahhabi teachings disapprove of veneration of the historical sites associated with early Islam, on the grounds that only God should be worshipped and that veneration of sites associated with mortals leads to idolatry.[59] Many buildings associated with early Islam, including mazaar, mausoleums and other artifacts have been destroyed in Saudi Arabia by Wahhabis from early 19th century through the present day.[60][61] This practice has proved controversial and has received considerable criticism from Sunni and Shia Muslims and in the non-Muslim World.

International influence and propagation

According to observers such as Gilles Kepel, Wahhabism gained considerable influence in the Islamic World following a tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period. The Saudi government began to spend tens of billions of dollars throughout the Islamic World to promote Wahhabism, which was sometimes referred to as "petro-Islam".[62] Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100 billion"[63], between $2 and 3 billion per year since 1975." (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1 billion/year)[64], and "at least $87 billion" from 1987-2007[65]

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[66] It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship.[67] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[68] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[69] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".[64]

This financial power has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew,[66] and has caused the Saudi interpretation to be perceived as the correct interpretation in many Muslims' minds.[70][71]

Explanation for influence

Khaled Abou El Fadl attributed the appeal of Wahhabism to some Muslims as stemming from

  • Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman Empire;
  • Reformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ;)
  • Destruction of the Hejaaz Khilafa in 1925;
  • Control of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking;
  • Oil, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oil export revenue.[72]

See also


  1. ^ Our good name: a company's fight to defend its honor J. Phillip London, C.A.C.I., Inc – 2008, "wahhabism is considered in particular an ultra-conservative orientation".
  2. ^ Sunni Islam
  3. ^ a b c "Wahhabi". GlobalSecurity.org. 2005-04-27. Archived from the original on 2005-05-07. http://web.archive.org/web/20050507090328/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm. Retrieved 2008-05-10.
  4. ^ "Wahhābī". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/634039/Wahhabi. Retrieved 2010-12-12.
  5. ^ "History of Islam – Sheikh Ibn Abdul Wahab of Najd – by Prof. Dr. Nazeer Ahmed, PhD". historyofislam.com. http://historyofislam.com/contents/resistance-and-reform/shaykh-ibn-abdul-wahhab-of-najd/.
  6. ^ M Zarabozo, Jamaal al Din (2003). The Life, Teachings and Influence of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab. Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Daw`ah and Guidance. p. pages 26 and 27.
  7. ^ PBS Frontline. "Analyses – Wahhabism". http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html. Retrieved 27 January 2012. "For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's dominant faith."
  8. ^ a b c d Esposito 2003, p. 333
  9. ^ Washington Post, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge
  10. ^ John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, p.50
  11. ^ Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith. Leiden University's ISIM Review, Spring 2008, #21.
  12. ^ « Saudi Wahhabism is the most dangerous religious currents », El Khabar Ousbouî, 30 août 2010
  13. ^ BOOK REVIEWS – Robinson 3 (1): 116 – Journal of Islamic Studies
  14. ^ Tarikh Najd by 'Husain ibn Ghannam, Vol. 1, Pg. 76–77
  15. ^ 'Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, by 'Uthman ibn Bishr an-Najdi, Vol. 1, Pg. 7–8
  16. ^ Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, by Judge Ahmad ibn 'Hajar al-Butami, Pg. 17–19
  17. ^ Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: His Da'wah and Life Story, by Shaikh ibn Baaz, Pg. 21
  18. ^ Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, by Judge Ahmad ibn 'Hajar al-Butami, Pg. 28
  19. ^ a b English, Jeanette M. (02 2011) [2011] "14" (Paper) Infidel behind the paradoxical veil 1 (first ed.) http://books.google.at/: AuthorHouse™ p. 276 ISBN 978-1-4567-2810-6 (sc) LCCN 2011900551 archived from the original on 2011-02-03 http://books.google.at/books?id=k4Zr0yDjrHMC&pg=PA260&lpg=PA260&dq=%22Ibn+Saud%22+140+years+-wikipedia.org&source=bl&ots=il5HbeVOUD&sig=Dwrf1ubbNbNkkNc_9DuuG7laAwE&hl=de&sa=X&ei=CeyFT7btLorO4QSspaHIBw&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22Ibn%20Saud%22%20140%20years%20-wikipedia.org&f=false. Retrieved 2012-04-11 "In the last years of the 18th century, Ibn Saud attempted to seize control of Arabia and its outer lying regions and his heirs spent the next 150 years in this pursuit. This was done at the expense of the overlords of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the house of Al Saud met with defeat at the hands of the Ottoman and Egyptian armies, resulting in the burning of Diriyah."
  20. ^ Wahhabism - A Critical Essay: Chapter 2
  21. ^ Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowan & Littlefield, (2001), pp.469–472
  22. ^ Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism
  23. ^ Wahhabism: A deadly scripture
  24. ^ Saudi Arabia's Export of Radical Islam
  25. ^ Islam in South and Southeast Asia
  26. ^ Radical Islam in Central Asia
  27. ^ "Allah". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 2008-05-28. 
  28. ^ DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 42. ISBN 0-19-516991-3. First edition.
  29. ^ Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p.61
  30. ^ Commins 2006, p. 12 According to Commins, Kitab al-Tawhid "has nothing to say on Islamic law, which guides Muslims’ everyday lives. This is a crucial point. One of the myths about Wahhabism is that its distinctive character stems from its affiliation with the supposedly ‘conservative’ or ‘strict’ Hanbali legal school. If that were the case, how could we explain the fact that the earliest opposition to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came from other Hanbali scholars? Or that a tradition of anti-Wahhabi Hanbalism persisted into the nineteenth century? As an expert on law in Saudi Arabia notes, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da’wa or religious reawakening… The Wahhabis’ bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh [jurisprudence] rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions.’"
  31. ^ http://mailofislam.webstarts.com/uploads/fitna-tul-wahhabiyyah.pdf
  32. ^ "Fitanatul Wahhabiya - LET US CORRECT OUR ISLAMIC FAITH". Correctislamicfaith.com. http://www.correctislamicfaith.com/fitanatulwahhabiya.htm. Retrieved 2012-06-12.
  33. ^ "wahabi, quran reading, sunni islam, wahhabism, wahhabi, become a muslim, islam followers, followers of islam". Yakhwajagaribnawaz.com. http://www.yakhwajagaribnawaz.com/islam/wahhabis.htm. Retrieved 2012-06-12.
  34. ^ "ijtihad (Islamic law) - Britannica Online Encyclopedia". Britannica.com. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/282550/ijtihad. Retrieved 2012-06-12.
  35. ^ Oleh: Luthfi Assyaukanie. "Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-1791) - JIL English Edition". Islamlib.com. http://islamlib.com/en/article/muhammad-ibn-abd-al-wahab-1703-1791. Retrieved 2012-06-12.
  36. ^ "Jism, Tajseem, and the Mujassimah (Anthropomorphists) in the Ash'arite Textbooks and in the Works of Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah: A Brief Comparison". Asharis.com. 2009-07-27. http://www.asharis.com/creed/articles/bolnh-ibn-taymiyyah-the-ashari-scholars-and-those-affirming-jism-for-allaah.cfm. Retrieved 2012-06-12.
  37. ^ Ibn Taymiyyah. Sharh-Al-Aqeedat-Il-Wasitiyah. Dar us Salam Publications. http://www.scribd.com/doc/24706466/Sharh-Al-Aqeedat-Il-Wasitiyah. "The followers of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah occupy a moderate position between the Ahlut Ta'teel (Jahmiyyah) and Ahlut Tamtheel (Mushabbiha), and are moderate between the Jabariyah sect and the Qadariyah sect regarding the Acts of Allah, and are moderate about the Promises of Allah between the Murji'ah and the Wa'eediyah sects among Qadariyah and are moderate on matters of the Faith and names of the religion between the Harooriyah and Mu'tazilah, and between the Murji'ah and Jahmiyah and are moderate regarding the Companions of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, between the Raafidah and the Khawarij."
  38. ^ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): p.235.
  39. ^ Kingdom without borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers
  40. ^ The Destruction of Holy Sites in Mecca and Medina By Irfan Ahmed in Islamic Magazine, Issue 1, July 2006
  41. ^ Nibras Kazimi, A Paladin Gears Up for War, The New York Sun, November 1, 2007
  42. ^ John R Bradley, Saudi's Shi'ites walk tightrope, Asia Times, March 17, 2005
  43. ^ Bouti debate with Salafi
  44. ^ "Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation",[dead link] Islamic Supreme Council of America
  45. ^ The Islamists Have it Wrong By Abdul Hadi Palazzi Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2001
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Further reading

  • Commins, David Dean (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-84885-014-X.
  • Esposito, John (2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512558-4.
  • Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts (1st English edition ed.). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00877-4.
  • Saint-Prot, Charles. Islam. L'avenir de la tradition entre révolution et occidentalisation (Islam. The Future of Tradition between Revolution and Westernization). Paris: Le Rocher, 2008.

External links